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Abstract 
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particular model used to characterize the economic system, there is a capital feedback effect 
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1 Introduction
In this paper we revisit an important theme in environmental macroeconomics, namely the
environmental and economic effects of public abatement activities. The existing literature
typically studies environmental policy with the aid of “linear models” in which gradual changes
in dirt emissions have gradual effects on the ecological system – Bovenberg and Heijdra (1998,
2002) are examples of this approach.
In recent years, however, prominent ecologists have argued that in many cases nature does
not respond smoothly to gradual changes at all (e.g. Arrow et al. 1995). Scheffer et al. (2001)
postulate the key elements of this new view. First, ecosystems do not respond smoothly to
gradual changes in dirt flows, abrupt “catastrophic shifts” may be possible in the vicinity of
threshold points, and there are typically no early warning signals for such shifts.1 Second,
there may be multiple stable equilibria. Third, irreversibility and hysteresis are all possible.
The prototypical example of the phenomenon under consideration concerns shallow lakes:
One of the best-studied and most dramatic state shifts is the sudden loss of trans-
parency and vegetation observed in shallow lakes subject to human-induced eu-
trophication. The pristine state of most shallow lakes is probably one of clear
water and a rich submerged vegetation. Nutrient loading has changed this situa-
tion in many cases. Remarkably, water clarity often seems to be hardly affected
by increased nutrient concentration until a critical threshold is passed, at which
the lake shifts abruptly from clear to turbid. With this increase in turbidity, sub-
merged plants largely disappear. Associated loss of animal diversity and reduction
of the high algal biomass makes this state undesired. Reduction of nutrient con-
centrations is often insufficient to restore the vegetated clear state. Indeed, the
restoration of clear water happens at substantially lower nutrient levels than those
at which the collapse of the vegetation occurred (Scheffer et al., 2001, p. 592).
The nonlinear ecological dynamics described by Scheffer et al. (2001) now carries the name
Shallow-Lake Dynamics (SLD hereafter).2 But the same phenomenon holds for a range of
1There is an emerging literature on early warning systems. See Biggs et al. (2009).
2For overviews of the SLD approach, see Muradian (2001), Ma¨ler et al. (2003), Brock and Starrett (2003),
and Wagener (2009). For economic applications of SLD, see Heijnen and Wagener (2009), Ranjan and Shortle
(2007), and Wirl (2004). A related nonlinear approach is used by Prieur (2009).
1
other ecological systems such as coral reefs, boreal forests, savannas and grasslands, and seas.3
Ecological systems featuring thresholds and flip points appear to be the rule rather than the
exception. Indeed, there now exist several websites with databases documenting a broad
variety of cases.4
The objective of this paper is to study the effects of public abatement on the environment
and the economic system when the ecological system features SLD. We have chosen to focus
on SLD not because we think that the ecology literally behaves just like a shallow lake but
rather because SLD provides a simple and tractable framework in which there are potentially
multiple stable steady states.5 The specific scenario that we study thus has the following key
features. First, we assume that the flow of dirt is such that there exist two stable ecological
steady-state equilibria. Second, we postulate that the ecological system has settled down
at the “bad” equilibrium featuring a high stock of pollution.6 In this setting we consider
which kind of abatement policy the policy maker should conduct in order to clean up the
environment and to move the ecological equilibrium from the bad to the good steady state.
Our mode of attack is as follows. To study the economic effects of abatement, we develop
a basic representative-agent model of a closed economy. Households practice intertemporal
consumption smoothing and accumulate capital that is rented out to perfectly competitive
firms. Following Bovenberg and Heijdra (2002), we assume that the capital stock is the pol-
luting production factor. Households enjoy living in a clean environment but act as free riders
and thus fail to internalize the external effects caused by their capital accumulation decisions.
As a result, there is a meaningful role for the policy maker. By restricting attention to abate-
ment, we implicitly assume that the policy maker has a fairly restrictive set of instruments
to conduct its environmental policy. Indeed, as we argue in the paper, the first-best social
3See, for example, Ma¨ler and Li (2010), Cre´pin (2007), Janssen, Anderies, and Walker (2004), and Cre´pin
(2003).
4See the threshold databases of the Resilience Alliance (www.resalliance.org) and the Stockholm Re-
silience Centre (www.stockholmresilience.org). Arrow et al. (1995, p. 521) define resilience as “a measure
of the magnitude of disturbances that can be absorbed before a system centered on one locally stable equilib-
rium flips to another.”
5For a survey on ecosystem dynamics, see Levin and Pacala (2003). They briefly discuss SLD on pages
79-80. In future work we will study alternative specifications for the ecological system. We believe our main
results to be quite robust.
6In the context of our model this sorry state of affairs could have arisen if the capital stock was much more
polluting in the past than it is at present.
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optimum calls for a positive capital tax, but this Pigouvian instrument is not available by
assumption. A temporary abatement policy can nevertheless be successful in steering the
ecological equilibrium from the bad to the good steady state, thus increasing welfare of the
representative agent.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the core model, con-
sisting of an ecological system featuring SLD and an economic system. Section 3 studies
the environmental and macroeconomic effects of a stepwise temporary abatement shock. We
analytically characterize the qualitative effects at impact, during transition, and in the long
run. To visualize and quantify these effects we also develop a plausibly calibrated version of
the model. The model features a trade-off between shock size and shock duration. Given the
form of the dirt flow equation, the best abatement policy in the class of stepwise shocks is a
“cold turkey” policy, i.e. the maximum feasible shock for the shortest possible duration. In
Section 4 we study some extensions to the model. The first extension endogenizes the rep-
resentative household’s labour supply decision. This makes abatement policy more difficult
because labour supply and the capital stock (and thus pollution) expand during transition
as a result of the additional taxes needed to finance the abatement spending. The second
extension assumes that the economy is populated by overlapping generations of finite-lived
agents. In this setting abatement policy becomes easier because the tax increases leads to
capital crowing out (and reduced pollution) during transition. In both extensions the cold
turkey result continues to hold. Finally, in Section 5 we offer a brief summary of the main
results, whilst the Appendix presents some details of the welfare analysis.
2 Core model
2.1 Ecological system
The environment is modelled as a renewable resource stock. Its quality depends negatively
on the flow of dirt, D (t), that is generated in the production process:
D (t) ≡ κK(t)− γG(t), κ > 0, γ > 0, (1)
where K (t) is the private capital stock (see below), and G (t) represents abatement activities
by the government. Capital is assumed to be the polluting factor of production, just as in
3
Bovenberg and Heijdra (1998, 2002).7 By definition the flow of dirt must be non-negative
(D (t) ≥ 0).8 Denoting the stock of pollution at time t by P (t), we write the general form of
the emission equation as:
P˙ (t) = −piP (t) +
P (t)2
P (t)2 + 1
+D (t) , pi >
1
2
, (2)
where P˙ (t) ≡ dP (t) /dt. The first term on the right-hand side shows that nature features
a regenerative capacity (since pi > 0), whilst the second term represents the shallow-lake
dynamics (SLD) – see Ma¨ler et al. (2003, p. 606).
We assume that pi > 12 , thus ensuring that nature does not feature irreversible equilibria.
To see why this is the case, consider Figure 1 depicting the phase diagram for the stock of
pollution. The P˙ (t) = 0 line is obtained from (2) and represents all combinations of P (t)
and D (t) such that the stock of pollution is constant over time. With pi > 12 the P˙ (t) = 0
line is S-shaped, with threshold points at D (t) = DL and D (t) = DU .
9 The vertical arrows
depict the dynamic forces operating on the stock of pollution off the P˙ (t) = 0 line.
For time-invariant dirt flows satisfying 0 ≤ D < DL and D > DU , there is a unique and
stable ecological steady state to which nature converges. In contrast, for DL ≤ D ≤ DU there
exist two stable ecological steady-state equilibria, i.e. the lower branch (through points C′,
A, and B) and the upper branch (from point C to point D and beyond) are both stable.10
Which particular steady state is attained depends on initial conditions, i.e. the ecological
7Xepapadeas (2005, p. 1239) proposes a more general functional form of the type D (t) = Φ (K (t) , G (t))
with ∂Φ/∂K (t) > 0 and ∂Φ/∂G (t) < 0. We have chosen a linear form for convenience and because it allows
us to zero in on the nonlinear features due to SLD.
8We interpret D (t) as the net dirt flow which must be non-negative by definition. Initiatives such as Carbon
Capture and Storage (CCS) can be seen as a way to increase the value of pi in the ecological function (2).
Since CCS is rather ineffective at present, we ignore this mechanism in this paper.
9These points are implicitly defined. The P -coordinates of points B and C in Figure 1 are the solutions to:
φ (pi, P ) ≡ −
pi
2
+
P
(1 + P 2)2
= 0.
The funtion φ (pi, P ) is the derivative with respect to P of the right-hand side of (2). The zeroes of this function
are associated with one local minimum dirt flow and one local maximum dirt flow. These dirt flow thresholds
are themselves obtained by substituting these coordinates into (2) and imposing P˙ (t) = 0. For pi = 1/2, we
find PL = 1 and DL = 0, i.e. point C is on the vertical axis and the ecology features irreversible equilibria,
namely all steady-state points located on the upper branch of the P˙ (t) = 0 line. Since the flow of dirt cannot
become negative, there is no way to get to the lower branch from there.
10The branch connecting points B and C is unstable, i.e. all vertical arrows point away from it.
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model features hysteresis. An economy which starts out with a relatively low dirt flow will
find itself on the lower branch. Even a sizeable increase in the dirt flow will only result
in a small increase in the steady-state stock of pollution – see for example the move from
point C′ to A. An economy which lets things get too dirty, however, and produces a dirt flow
exceeding the upper threshold (D (t) > DU ) will experience a catastrophic increase in the
pollution stock and end up on the upper branch of the P˙ (t) = 0 line, say at point B′. A
subsequent reduction in the dirt flow will move the ecological steady-state along the upper
branch, say from point B′ to point D. Even though the dirt flow is the same in the dirty
equilibrium D and in the clean equilibrium A, D (t) = Dˆ0, the stock of pollution is much
higher in the dirty equilibrium, i.e. PˆB > PˆG. To make things worse, there is no way to get
from D to A without reducing the dirt flow below its lower threshold value for a long enough
period of time.
In a qualitative sense, to get from point D to point A, the following road must be traveled.
First, the dirt flow should be set such that D (t) < DL. In Figure 1 this produces, say, the
shift from point D to D1. This point lies in the basin of attraction of the lower branch of the
P˙ (t) = 0 line as the vertical arrows indicate. Abstracting from economic feed-back effects
(see below), the ecology moves in the direction of points C1 and E1. Second, the stock of
pollution must be allowed to fall below a critical level, PE , representing the stock associated
with point E in the figure. Third, once the ecology has passed point E1, the dirt flow must
be restored to its initial level Dˆ0. Since P (t) < PE , the ecology will ultimately converge to
point A.
But this is the mechanical story associated with SLD. As is shown in equation (1), the
flow of dirt depends in part on the abatement activities of the government but also on the
macroeconomic capital stock, i.e. on the savings behaviour of the economic agents in the
economy. And to make things worse, the resources needed by the government to conduct
its abatement activities will in general affect the behaviour of these very agents, i.e. K (t)
is not independent from G (t). In the next subsection a simple general equilibrium model is
postulated to capture this dependency.
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Figure 1: Ecological dynamics
2.2 Economic system
In this subsection we formulate a simple general equilibrium model of the macroeconomy.11
This core model describes a closed economy and is populated by representative households
and firms who are blessed with perfect foresight.
2.2.1 Households
The representative household lives forever, and features the following utility functional:
Λ(t) ≡
∫ ∞
t
[
lnC(τ) + εE ln
[
E¯ − P (τ)
] ]
· eρ(t−τ)dτ, (3)
where C(τ) denotes consumption of private commodities at time τ , E (τ) ≡ E¯ − P (τ) > 0
measures the quality of the environment, E¯ is some pristine value attained in a non-polluting
society, εE denotes the weight in overall utility attached to environmental amenities, and ρ ≥ 0
stands for the pure rate of time preference. Since utility is separable in its two arguments, the
quality of the environment does not directly affect household consumption. Since the felicity
11Our discussion of the standard economic models used in this paper is quite compact. For a textbook
treatment of these models, see for example Heijdra (2009).
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function for private consumption is logarithmic, the model features a unitary intertemporal
elasticity of substitution.12 Without leisure entering utility, labour supply is exogenously
fixed (but see subsection 4.1 below).
Households face the following budget identity:
A˙ (τ) = r(τ)A(τ) + w(τ)− T (τ)− C(τ), (4)
where r(τ) denotes the real rate of interest on financial assets, w(τ) represents the wage rate,
T (τ) are net lump-sum taxes, and A(τ) stands for real financial assets owned in period τ . As
usual we define A˙ (τ) ≡ dA(τ)/dτ .
The representative agent chooses paths for C(τ) and A (τ) which maximize (3) subject to
(4) and a solvency requirement. The solution for consumption at time t amounts to:
C(t) = ρ · [A(t) +H(t)], (5)
where human wealth, H(t), is given by:
H(t) ≡
∫ ∞
t
[w(τ)− T (τ)] · e−
∫ τ
t
r(s)dsdτ. (6)
The optimal time profile for consumption is given by the Euler equation:
C˙ (τ)
C (τ)
= r (τ)− ρ, τ ≥ t. (7)
Equation (5) shows that the agent consumes a constant proportion of total wealth in the
planning period, whilst equation (7) shows that consumption growth over time is chosen to
be equal to the rationally anticipated gap between the interest rate and the rate of time
preference. Finally, the expression in (6) shows that human wealth is given by the discounted
value of after-tax wage payments. Intuitively it thus represents the after-tax value of the
agent’s unitary time endowment.
2.2.2 Firms
The production sector of the economy is perfectly competitive. The production function is
Cobb-Douglas, with constant returns to scale to the factors capital, K(t), and labour, L(t):
Y (t) ≡ F (K(t), L(t)) = Ω0K(t)
εLL(t)1−εL , Ω0 > 0, 0 < εL < 1, (8)
12We adopt simple functional forms for felicity and production functions in order to keep our economic
analysis as simple as possible. By adopting this approach we are better able to zoom in on the complications
arising from the nonlinear environmental dynamics.
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Table 1: The core model
C˙(t)
C (t)
= r(t)− ρ, ρ > 0 (T1.1)
K˙(t) = Y (t)− C(t)−G (t)− δK(t) (T1.2)
[r(t) + δ]K(t) = (1− εL)Y (t) (T1.3)
w(t)L(t) = εLY (t) (T1.4)
Y (t) = Ω0L(t)
εLK(t)1−εL , Ω0 > 0, 0 < εL < 1 (T1.5)
L(t) = 1 (T1.6)
P˙ (t) = −piP (t) +
P (t)2
P (t)2 + 1
+D(t), pi >
1
2
(T1.7)
D(t) = κK(t)− γG(t), κ > 0, γ > 0 (T1.8)
Endogenous: consumption, C (t), capital stock, K (t), output, Y (t), interest rate, r (t), wage
rate, w (t), employment, L (t), pollution stock, P (t), dirt flow, D (t). Exogenous: govern-
ment abatement, G (t). Parameters: rate of time preference, ρ, depreciation rate of capital, δ,
labour coefficient in the technology, εL, and scale factor in the technology, Ω0. Ecological pa-
rameters: lake resilience, pi, capital dirt coefficient, κ, and abatement clean-up coefficient, γ.
where Y (t) denotes gross output. The representative firm maximizes the value of the firm,
V (t), which is defined as follows:
V (t) =
∫ ∞
t
[Y (τ)− w(τ)L(τ)− I(τ)] · e−
∫ τ
t
r(s)dsdτ, (9)
subject to the production function, and the capital accumulation identity:
K˙ (τ) = I (τ)− δK (τ) , (10)
where K˙(τ) ≡ dK(τ)/dτ denotes the rate of change in the capital stock and δ is the deprecia-
tion rate (δ > 0). The first-order conditions for value maximization imply the usual marginal
productivity conditions:
∂Y (τ)
∂K(τ)
= r(τ) + δ,
∂Y (τ)
∂L(τ)
= w(τ). (11)
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Figure 2: Consumption-capital dynamics in the core model
Since we abstract from adjustment costs in investment, the value of equity corresponds to the
replacement value of the capital stock, i.e. V (t) = K(t).
2.2.3 Equilibrium
For convenience, the key equations of the core model have been gathered in Table 1. Equation
(T1.1) is the Euler equation (7), whilst equations (T1.5) and (T1.7)–(T1.8) just restate,
respectively (8), (2), and (1). Labour supply is exogenous so L (t) = 1 – see (T1.6). The
factor demand expressions in (11) have been rewritten by using the production function – see
(T1.3) and (T1.4). Equation (T1.2) is obtained by combining (10) with the goods market
clearing condition for a closed economy, i.e. Y (τ) = C (τ) + I (τ) + G (τ). Finally, in the
absence of government debt, claims on the capital stock are the only assets available, i.e.
A (t) = K (t).
The phase diagram for the economic system is depicted in Figure 2.13 The initial equilib-
13Note that the economy influences the ecology but not vice versa. Hence, even though the full model is
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rium, by assumption featuring no public abatement, is at point E0. Steady-state consumption
and the capital stock are given by, respectively, Cˆ and Kˆ. The equilibrium is saddle-point
stable, with SP0 representing the saddle path, and is dynamically efficient, i.e. Kˆ is strictly
less than the golden-rule capital stock, KˆGR.
3 Environmental and macroeconomic effects of public abate-
ment
In this section we study the effects of public abatement on the environment, the macroecon-
omy, and on individual welfare. Much of the existing literature on environmental macroeco-
nomics only looks at “regular”, non-hysteretic, ecological systems – see for example Bovenberg
and Heijdra (1998, 2002) and the references therein. In essence this literature assumes that
the P˙ (t) = 0 curve is monotonically increasing, rather than S-shaped. In such a setting,
the policy maker must engage in a permanent abatement policy in order to attain a par-
ticular welfare maximizing point on the P˙ (t) = 0 curve. Because the ecological system is
non-hysteretic, a temporary abatement policy cannot be used.
In stark contrast, as was argued above in our intuitive discussion of Figure 1, in the
presence of SLD the ecological system is hysteretic, and there may be two welfare-rankable
equilibria, namely a clean and a dirty one. Furthermore, a suitably designed temporary
abatement policy can be used to shift the environment from the dirty to the clean equilibrium.
Assume that the economy is initially at the steady-state equilibrium (point E0 in Figure 2)
and that the ecological equilibrium is at point D in Figure 1. Since G (t) = 0 initially, the dirt
flow associated with point D is equal to Dˆ0 = κKˆ. At this dirt flow there is another stable
equilibrium at point A in Figure 1 which, from a steady-state perspective, features a higher
level of welfare.
In order to move the ecological equilibrium from point D to point A, we assume that the
policy maker engages in an abatement policy of the following type:
G (t) =

 G for 0 ≤ t ≤ tE0 for t > tE (12)
characterized by a three-dimensional system of nonlinear differential equations, the recursivity of this system
allows us to use simple two-dimensional phase diagrams such as Figures 1 and 2.
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where the shock is administered at time t = 0, tE represents the duration of the shock, and G
is its size. Figure 2 shows the qualitative nature of the adjustment paths of consumption and
the capital stock. The abatement shock shifts the K˙ (t) = 0 line down as less resources are
available for private consumption and investment. If the shock were permanent (tE → ∞),
the equilibrium would instantaneously shift from E0 to E1, i.e. the economy would feature
a once off reduction in private consumption. Provided G is sufficiently large such that 0 ≤
κKˆ − γG < DL, the ecology would gradually move to the lower branch of the P˙ (t) = 0 line
in Figure 1. It would reach a steady state to the left of point C′.
To reach point A from D a temporary policy (0 < tE <∞) is needed. In terms of Figure
2, such a shock produces the adjustment path from A through B to E0. At impact (t = 0)
the capital stock is predetermined and the economy shifts from point E0 to A. The increased
tax bill leads to an immediate reduction in human wealth and thus causes agents to cut back
consumption – see (5) and (6) above.14
At point A, the dynamic forces are those indicated by the north-west arrows and for
0 < t < tE the economy gradually moves from A to B. During transition the capital stock
falls short of its steady-state level (K (t) < Kˆ), the interest rate exceeds the rate of time
preference (r (t) > ρ), and the optimal consumption profile is upward sloping – see (7) above.
Also, since the economy is located above the then relevant K˙ (t) = 0 line, there is too little
investment and the capital stock falls over time. Point B is reached at time tE , at which
moment the K˙ (t) = 0 curve shifts back to its original position. The resources previously
used for abatement can once again be used to restore the capital stock and consumption to
their original levels.
The flow of dirt during the abatement policy features two jumps (namely at times t = 0 and
t = tE), is downward sloping for 0 < t < tE , and is upward sloping for t ≥ tE . Interestingly,
the policy shock prompts a reaction from the private sector in the form of a temporarily lower
capital stock which boosts the environmental cleanup.
Of course, not just any temporary policy will result in a successful transition from point
14Taxes and government spending are related to each other via the intertemporal government budget con-
straint. In the absence of government debt at time t, this constraint is given by:
0 ≡
∫ ∞
t
[T (τ)−G(τ)] · e−
∫
τ
t
r(s)dsdτ.
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Table 2: Structural parameters and steady-state features
Economic system:
ρ = 0.04 δ = 0.07 εL = 0.70 Ω0 = 0.7401
rˆ = 0.04 Kˆ = 2.7273 Yˆ = 1.000 Cˆ = 0.8091 Iˆ = 0.1909 G = 0
Ecological system:
pi = 0.52 κ = 0.0147 γ = 0.302 εE = 0.9 E¯ = 2
DL = 0.0196 DU = 0.0735 Dˆ0 = 0.04 PˆB = 1.2482 PˆG = 0.0936 PE = 0.6581
D to A in Figure 1. Indeed, there is a trade-off between the size of the abatement shock (G)
and its duration (tE). For a given value of G, tE must be sufficiently large for the ecological
system to “sail” past points C and E in Figure 1. Vice versa, for a given value of tE , G must
be large enough. We provide quantitative evidence for this trade-off below.
In Figure 3 we visualize the adjustment paths for the key variables using a plausibly
calibrated version of the model.15 The parameters and key features of the economic and
ecological steady states are reported in Table 2. Since Dˆ0 is in between the lower and upper
threshold values, there exist two stable ecological equilibria – see points A (with PˆG = 0.0936)
and D (with PˆB = 1.2482) in Figure 3(b). The critical pollution stock associated with Pˆ0 is
at point E where PE = 0.6581.
The shock consists of a temporary increase in government abatement equal to ten percent
of initial output, i.e. G = 0.1 for 0 ≤ t < tE . The minimum duration for a shock of this
size to succeed in steering the ecology to the clean ecological equilibrium is tE = 41 years
– see Figure 3(a). The other panels in Figure 3 confirm the qualitative results relating to
the economy. Panel (c) shows that the capital stock is reduced quite substantially during
transition, reaching a minimum of K (tE) = 2.3998. Similarly, as panel (d) shows, private
consumption is reduced at impact to C (0) = 0.7092.
The ecological effects are as follows. At impact the abatement shock shifts the P˙ (t) curve
down (from [P˙ (t)]0 to [P˙ (t)]1 in panel (b)). For P (t) = PˆB, the abatement shock ensures
15The parameters of the economic system take the values typically assumed in the macroeconomic literature.
The resulting steady-state interest rate, capital-output ratio, and output shares of consumption and investment
are quite realistic. Much less is known about the parameters of ecological system. We have chosen these
parameters such that the initial steady-state is in the region with multiple equilibria.
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Figure 3: Dynamic effects of government abatement: Core model
(a) government abatement (G(t)) (b) pollution dynamics (P˙ (t))
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Parameters: see Table 2. The initial ecological equilibrium is at point D in panel (b).
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that the stock of pollution starts to fall at impact, i.e. at point D1 in panel (b) P˙ (0) < 0.
Two things happen over time. First, the pollution stock gradually declines as P˙ (t) < 0, for
t ≥ 0. Second, the dashed P˙ (t) line itself gradually shifts down in the direction of the thin
dotted line as a result of capital crowding out. At time tE = 41, the ecology arrives at point
E2 in panel (b), shortly thereafter P (t) < PE , the abatement policy is terminated, and the
P˙ (t) line immediately shifts up to the thin dotted directly line below [P˙ (t)]0. The ecology
jumps from E2 to E3 in panel (b). Thereafter, the gradual increase in the capital stock shifts
the P˙ (t) line back to [P˙ (t)]0 and the ecology converges to point A. Panels (e) and (f) of
Figure 3 depict the time paths of, respectively, the flow of dirt and the pollution stock. The
new ecological equilibrium is attained after more than sixty years.
Points D and A feature the same steady-state value for consumption but environmental
quality is much higher in the latter point, so it follows that steady-state welfare is higher after
the abatement policy. But is welfare also increased when we take the transitional dynamic
effects on consumption and the pollution stock into account? Since the shock occurs at time
t = 0, welfare is given by:
ΛA(0) ≡
∫ ∞
0
[
lnC(t) + εE ln
[
E¯ − P (t)
] ]
· e−ρtdt. (13)
Using the values for εE and E¯ from Table 2, as well as the solution paths for C (t) and P (t)
during transition, we find that ΛA (0) = −5.890 with the abatement policy. At the initial
dirty equilibrium, welfare is:
ΛD (0) =
1
ρ
·
[
ln Cˆ + εE ln[E¯ − PˆB]
]
, (14)
which is equal to ΛD (0) = −11.71. The welfare gain in utility terms is thus equal to
∆Λ (0) ≡ ΛA(0) − ΛD (0) = 5.82. To facilitate the interpretation of this gain we compute
an “equivalent-variation” type welfare measure by computing what Cˆ would have to be in
(14) to get ∆Λ (0) to be zero. Denoting this hypothetical consumption level by Cˆ ′ we find
Cˆ ′ = eρΛA(0)−εE ln[E¯−PˆB]. An interpretable welfare measure is then:
EV (0) ≡ 100 ·
Cˆ ′ − Cˆ
Cˆ
. (15)
Intuitively, EV (0) represents consumption that is missed out on if the abatement policy is
not pursued. For the policy combination (G, tE) = (0.1, 41) we find that EV (0) is 26.3%, i.e.
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lost consumption is more than one quarter of actual consumption at point D and the welfare
gains of abatement are huge.
As was mentioned above, there is a trade-off between the size of the abatement shock
(G) and its duration (tE). We provide quantitative evidence for this trade-off in Figure 4(a).
This figure plots the minimum shock size for shock durations ranging from 25 to 50 years.16
For tE = 41 a value of G = 0.1 is sufficient, but for tE = 30 the shock must be increased to
G = 0.1166, whilst for tE = 25 it must be set at G = 0.1293. In short, Figure 4(a) shows that
the size-duration locus is downward sloping. Not all points along the size-duration locus are
feasible. Indeed, points to the left of the vertical dashed line are infeasible because the dirt
flow constraint, D (t) ≥ 0, is violated for some t during transition. It follows that only the
size-duration locus to the right of the dashed line is feasible.
The clear trade-off between shock size and duration takes us to the social welfare issue.
What is better from a welfare-theoretic point of view, a long-lasting small shock, or a short-
lasting big shock? Figure 4(b) plots the optimized values of Λ (0) for different values of tE
(and the associated values of G implied by the trade-off). It is clear from the figure that a
“cold turkey” abatement policy is optimal, i.e. to get from D to A in Figure 1, the duration
should be as small as possible and the shock size as large as needed. Indeed, for the cold
turkey combination (G, tE) = (0.1166, 30) we find that EV (0) is a whopping 33.7% of initial
consumption.
Of course, there is another welfare question that can be posed. Given that the ecology
is located in the dirty equilibrium at point D in Figure 1, where on the lower branch of the
P˙ (t) = 0 curve should the new equilibrium be moved to? As we show in Appendix A, the
first-best social optimum calls for a non-zero tax on capital (θK > 0) and no abatement
(G = 0) in the long run. This establishes a new ecological equilibrium to the left of point
A as the Pigouvian capital tax internalizes the polluting effects of the capital stock. The
first-best equilibrium values are Kˆf = 2.3177, Yˆf = 0.9524, Cˆf = 0.7901, and Pˆf = 0.0766,
whilst the Pigouvian capital tax equals θK = 0.1077.
In the absence of capital taxation, however, the first-best social optimum cannot be decen-
tralized as privately optimal savings behaviour leads to the equalization of the net marginal
product of capital and the rate of time preference, so that the capital stock is equal to Kˆ
16For tE < 25 there is no feasible solution for the shock size.
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Figure 4: Size, duration, and welfare
(a) Size G versus duration tE (b) welfare effect (Λ(0))
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(> Kˆf ). As we show in Appendix B, however, the second-best social optimum still calls
for zero abatement in the long run. Since the second-best steady-state capital stock equals
Kˆs = Kˆ, it follows that Yˆs = Yˆ , Cˆs = Cˆ, Dˆs = Dˆ0, and Pˆs = PˆG. Lacking a Pigouvian tax
instrument, it is optimal for the policy maker to engineer the move from D to A in the fastest
way possible. Figure 4(a)–(b) illustrate this point.
4 Extensions
In this section we study two extensions to the core model. The first extension endogenizes the
labour supply decision of the infinitely lived representative agent. In such a setting, a tax-
financed abatement policy expands labour supply (as people get poorer), the capital stock,
and output. This dirties the environment and makes it harder to steer the ecology from the
dirty to the clean steady-state equilibrium.
In the second extension we take labour supply to be exogenous (as in the core model)
but assume that the economy is populated by overlapping generations of finitely-lived agents.
As in the core model, a tax-financed abatement policy crowds out the capital stock during
transition. Unlike the core model, however, the overlapping generations model features in-
tergenerational redistribution (both during transition and in the long run). This opens up
16
a useful role for public debt policy, namely to redistribute uneven welfare effects. The debt
policy itself introduces hysteresis into the economic system in that a deficit-financed tempo-
rary abatement policy causes a permanent effect on the capital stock, consumption, output,
wages , and the interest rate.
4.1 Endogenous labour supply
In the first extension we change the utility functional of the representative agent from (3) to:
Λ(t) ≡
∫ ∞
t
[
ln
[
C(τ)εC · [1− L(τ)]1−εC
]
+ εE ln
[
E¯ − P (τ)
] ]
· eρ(t−τ)dτ, (16)
with 0 < εC < 1. Here, L(τ) is labour supply and, since the time endowment is equal to
unity, 1−L(τ) represents the amount of leisure consumed by the household. The household’s
budget identity (4) is changed to reflect the endogeneity of labour supply:
A˙ (τ) = r(τ)A(τ) + w(τ)L (τ)− T (τ)− C(τ), (17)
where w(τ)L (τ) represents labour income in period τ .
The representative agent chooses time profiles for C(τ), L (τ), and A (τ) which maximize
(16) subject to (17) and a solvency requirement. The solutions for consumption and labour
supply in the planning period t amounts are:
C(t) = ρεC · [A(t) +H(t)], w (t) · [1− L (t)] = ρ (1− εC) · [A(t) +H(t)], (18)
where H (t) is defined in (6) above. Optimal consumption growth is still as given in (7) above.
By combining the two expressions in (18), we find that the optimal labour supply decision
leads to an equalization of the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption
to the wage rate, or:
L (t) = 1−
1− εC
εC
·
C (t)
w (t)
. (19)
Equation (19) replaces (T1.6) in Table 1.
The phase diagram for the endogenous labour supply (ELS) model is given in Figure 5. In
contrast to the core model, the ELS model features a downward sloping C˙ (t) = 0 line.17 For
17For all point on the C˙ (t) = 0 line, ρ + δ = FK (K/L, 1), i.e. there is a constant labour-capital ratio,
lˆ ≡ L/K. Labour market equilibrium then implies that the C˙ (t) = 0 line can be written as:
C (t) =
εCεL
1− εC
lˆεL−1 ·
[
1− lˆ ·K (t)
]
.
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Figure 5: Consumption-capital dynamics with endogenous labour supply
points above (below) the C˙ (t) = 0 line, consumption is too high (low), labour supply is too
low (high), the capital-labour ratio is too high (low), the interest rate falls short of (exceeds)
the rate of time preference, and consumption falls (rises) over time. The dynamics for the
capital stock is qualitatively the same as in the core model, and the ELS model features a
unique steady state at point E0.
A temporary abatement policy of the form given in (12) gives rise to the adjustment path
in Figure 5, consisting of an immediate jump from E0 to point A, a gradual move from A
to B and C, and a gradual move from C back to point E0. The intuition is as follows. At
impact the tax increase reduces human wealth, H (0), which prompts the agent to cut the
consumption of goods and leisure, i.e. labour supply increases. Provided the policy is of
sufficiently long duration, point A lies below the [K˙ (t) = 0]1 line and the agent saves part
of the additional wage income. Since the capital-labour ratio is low, the interest rate is high
and both consumption and the capital stock increase over time immediately after the shock.
This explains the gradual move from A to B.
At some time 0 < t < tE the economy arrives at point B, after which capital decumulation
takes place but consumption continues to grow. At time t = tE , the economy is at point C, the
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abatement policy is terminated, and the capital equilibrium locus shifts back to [K˙ (t) = 0]0.
From then on the dynamic forces are such as to increase both consumption and capital as the
economy moves from C to E0.
An interesting feature of the transition path for the capital stock is its non-monotonicity.
More importantly, at least during the early transition phase capital is crowded in as a result
of the tax-financed abatement shock, a phenomenon which complicates environmental policy
because it leads to an increase in the flow of dirt. So whereas capital decumulation helps
environmental policy in the core model during the early phases, it hinders policy in the ELS
model.
To investigate the quantitative significance of the negative feedback effect via the capital
stock we calibrate and simulate the ELS model. For ρ, δ, εL, κ, and γ we use the same
parameters as before – see Table 2. We choose εC such that the steady-state intertemporal
labour supply elasticity, (1 − Lˆ)/Lˆ, is equal to two. This gives εC = 0.3663 and Lˆ = 1/3.
Finally, we choose Ω0 such that steady-state output is equal to unity, Yˆ = 1. This gives
Ω0 = 1.5969.
Figure 6 illustrates the transition paths for a shock featuring G = 0.1. The minimum
feasible duration for this shock is tE = 52 years! Despite the fact that the core model and the
ELS model are initially in an identical steady state (as far as output, consumption, the capital
stock, and pollution are concerned), the abatement policy must be maintained for a much
longer period than in the core model when labour supply effects are taken into account. In
a quantitative sense, therefore, the capital-feedback effect is significant. As is shown in panel
(b), the capital stock features large fluctuations, reaching a maximum of about 2.95 for much
of the early transition phase, and a minimum of K (tE) = 2.6106. Similarly, output reaches a
maximum of about 1.08 reflecting the large spending multiplier that exists in the ELS model
(see also Heijdra, 2009, p. 511). Using the welfare measure developed above in (15), we
find that for the policy combination (G, tE) = (0.1, 52), EV (0) is 7.8%. Recall that in the
core model there was a welfare gain of 26.3% for the policy combination (G, tE) = (0.1, 41),
so the labour supply effect reduces the welfare gains of moving from the dirty to the clean
equilibrium.
Just as in the core model, there is no welfare-enhancing role for long-run abatement in
the ELS model. A permanent abatement policy would shift the economic equilibrium from
19
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Figure 6: Dynamic effects of government abatement: Endogenous labour supply
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E0 to E1 in Figure 5, and would result in a permanently higher steady-state capital stock and
thus a higher dirt flow. The economy would move further away from the first-best optimum.
In short, both the first-best and the second-best social optimum call for the smallest feasible
abatement level in the long run, i.e. for G = 0.
4.2 Finite lives
In the second extension we take labour supply to be exogenous but assume that individuals
face an age-independent probability of death, µ. In particular, we use the Blanchard (1985)
model of consumer behaviour. At time t, expected remaining lifetime utility of an individual
born at time v (v ≤ t) is given by:
EΛ (v, t) ≡
∫ ∞
t
[
lnC(v, τ) + εE ln
[
E¯ − P (τ)
] ]
· e(ρ+µ)(t−τ)dτ, (20)
where C (v, τ) is consumption, ρ is the pure rate of time preference, and µ is the instantaneous
mortality rate. With a positive mortality rate, future felicity is discounted more heavily than
in the representative-agent model because the mortal agent simply may not be alive to enjoy
felicity in the future – see Yaari (1965). Following Blanchard (1985) and Yaari (1965), we
assume that there exist perfect annuities. The actuarially fair annuity rate of interest is equal
to r (τ) + µ and rational individuals fully annuitize because it expands their choice set. The
agent’s budget identity is thus given by:
A˙(v, τ) = [r (τ) + µ]A(v, τ) + w(τ)− C(v, τ)− T (τ) , (21)
where A (v, τ) is the stock of financial assets at time τ of an agent born at time v. Newborn
agents are born without financial assets, i.e. A (v, v) = 0.
An agent born of vintage v chooses time profiles for C(v, τ) and A (v, τ) which maximize
(20) subject to (21) and a solvency requirement. The solution for consumption in the planning
period t amounts to:
C(v, t) = (ρ+ µ) · [A(v, t) +H(t)], (22)
where expected life-time human wealth at that time, H(t), is given by:
H(t) ≡
∫ ∞
t
[w(τ)− T (τ)] · e−
∫ τ
t
[r(s)+µ]dsdτ. (23)
21
The optimal time profile for individual consumption is of the same form as (7):
C˙ (v, τ)
C (v, τ)
= r (τ)− ρ, τ ≥ t ≥ v. (24)
In (22) the mortality rate features in the propensity to consume out of total wealth because
mortality is yet another reason to be impatient. In (23) the mortality rate features because
agents use the annuity rate of interest to discount after-tax non-asset income. Importantly,
the annuity rate drops out of the individual consumption growth equation because annuities
are perfect; a result first demonstrated by Yaari (1965, p. 147).
We assume that the crude birth rate is equal to the mortality rate so that (i) the aggregate
population is constant and can be normalized to unity, and (ii) the relative population size of
cohort v at time t (> v) is given by µe−µ(t−v). Aggregate variables can thus be calculated as
the weighted sum of the values for different generations, e.g. C(t) ≡
∫ t
−∞
C(v, t)µe−µ(t−v)dv is
aggregate consumption. By aggregating (24), we arrive at the aggregate consumption growth
equation:
C˙(t)
C(t)
= r (t)− ρ− µ(ρ+ µ) ·
A(t)
C(t)
=
C˙(v, t)
C(v, t)
− µ ·
C(t)− C(t, t)
C(t)
. (25)
Equation (25) has the same form as the Euler equation for individual households (24), except
for a correction term capturing the wealth redistribution caused by the turnover of genera-
tions. Optimal individual consumption growth is the same for all generations since they face
the same rate of interest. But the consumption level of old generations is higher than that of
young generations, reflecting the larger stock of financial assets owned by old generations. Be-
cause existing generations are continually being replaced by newborns, who are born without
financial wealth, aggregate consumption growth falls short of individual consumption growth.
The correction term appearing in (25) thus represents the difference in average consumption,
C(t), and consumption by newborns, C(t, t).
A well-known property of the Blanchard-Yaari model concerns the non-neutrality of public
debt. In the presence of public debt, the capital market equilibrium condition is given by
A (t) = K (t) +B (t) so that consumption growth equation is given by:
C˙(t)
C(t)
= r (t)− ρ− µ(ρ+ µ) ·
K(t) +B(t)
C(t)
. (26)
Equation (26) replaces replaces (T1.1) in Table 1.
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Figure 7: Consumption-capital dynamics with overlapping generations
The phase diagram for the overlapping generations (OG) model is given in Figure 7. We
assume that public debt is equal to zero initially. In contrast to the core model, the OG
model features an upward sloping C˙ (t) = 0 line.18 For points above (below) the C˙ (t) = 0
line, the generational turnover term is relatively small (large), the interest rate exceeds (falls
short of) the rate of time preference, and consumption rises (falls) over time. The dynamics
for the capital stock is exactly the same as in the core model, and the OG model features a
unique steady state at point E0.
A temporary abatement policy of the form given in (12) gives rise to the adjustment path
E0ABCE0 in Figure 5. The intuition is as follows. The shock shifts the capital equilibrium
locus to [K˙ (t) = 0]1. At impact the tax increase reduces human wealth for all agents, H (v, 0),
which prompts them reduce consumption. This is the jump from E0 to A directly below it.
At point A the interest rate is unchanged, but the generational turnover term is increased
so aggregate consumption gradually falls. Aggregate consumption, however, is too high to
18The C˙ (t) = 0 line is given by:
C (t) =
µ (ρ+ µ)K (t)
FK (K (t) , 1)− (ρ+ δ)
.
It is horizontal for K (t) = 0 and becomes vertical for K (t) → KˆRA, where KˆRA is the steady-state capital
stock in the core model (i.e. ρ+ δ = FK(Kˆ
RA, 1).
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maintain the initial capital stock Kˆ so capital starts to decumulate. At some time 0 < t < tE
the economy arrives at point B, after which aggregate consumption starts to increase even
though the capital stock continues to fall. At time t = tE , the economy is at point C, the
abatement policy is terminated, and the capital equilibrium locus shifts back to [K˙ (t) = 0]0.
From then on the dynamic forces are such as to increase both consumption and capital as the
economy moves from C to E0.
The transition paths for the core model and the OG model are qualitatively very similar.
The abatement shock cause temporary crowding out of capital, a feature which aids the
environmental cleanup. To glean the quantitative significance of this effect we once again
calibrate and simulate the model. This time we use the same parameters for δ, εL, Ω0, κ, and
γ as in the core model – see Table 2. We assume that the birth/mortality rate is µ = 0.015
and choose ρ such that the initial steady-state interest rate is the same as in the core model
(rˆ = 0.04). This gives ρ = 0.0374. The initial steady state is “observationally equivalent” to
the steady state for the core model, i.e. Yˆ = 1, Kˆ = 2.7273, Iˆ = 0.1909, and Cˆ = 0.8091.
At these parameter values, a shock of G = 0.1 succeeds in moving the ecology to the clean
equilibrium provided tE = 38 years. Hence, in the OG model the capital stock effect exerts a
stronger effect on the environmental cleanup than in the core model.
The distribution of costs and benefits of environmental policy is very uneven in the OG
model. In the scenario discussed so far, the costs are borne by all pre-shock generations
(whose v < 0) and all post-shock generations born before the policy is terminated (for whom
0 ≤ v < tE). Generations born after tE do not have to pay any taxes but benefit fully
from the environmental cleanup, more so the later they are born. Generalizing the welfare
measure given in (15) to the BY model (see Appendix C), we find for shock-time newborns
EV (0, 0) = 10.8% and for steady-state newborns EV (∞,∞) = 33.5%.
The uneven distribution of costs and benefits can be repaired by the policy maker because
public debt is non-neutral in the OG model. Both the economic allocation and the inter-
generational welfare implications of the abatement policy depend on the way the government
balances its budget. The periodic budget identity can be written as follows:
B˙(τ) = r(τ)B(τ) +G(τ)− T (τ). (27)
The government can finance its spending by either issuing more debt (B˙(τ) ≡ dB(τ)/dτ >
0) or by levying lump-sum taxes (T (τ)). The No Ponzi Game condition ensures that the
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Figure 8: Dynamic effects of government abatement: Overlapping generations
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government remains solvent:
lim
τ→∞
B(τ) · e−
∫ τ
t
r(s)ds = 0. (28)
The government’s intertemporal budget constraint is derived by integrating (27) and using
the solvency condition (28):
B(t) =
∫ ∞
t
[T (τ)−G(τ)] · e−
∫ τ
t
r(s)dsdτ. (29)
If there is a positive debt at time t, it must be covered in a present-value sense by future
primary surpluses.
The bond policy that we consider takes the following form. We assume that debt is
zero initially, i.e. B(0) = 0, and postulate a parametric tax path of the form T (t) = T0 +
T1
[
1− e−ξt
]
for t ≥ 0 and ξ > 0.19 Here T (0) = T0 stands for the initial tax, T (∞) = T0+T1
is the long-run tax, and ξ is the speed of debt stabilization. Using the tax function as well as
(12) in (29) we obtain the government solvency condition in terms of parameters:∫ ∞
0
[
T0 + T1
[
1− e−ξt
]]
· e−
∫ τ
t
r(s)dsdτ = G ·
∫ tE
0
e−
∫ τ
t
r(s)dsdτ. (30)
An abatement cum debt policy consists of the vector (G, tE , T0, T1, ξ) such that (i) tE is as
small as feasible for the given shock, and (ii) equation (30) is satisfied by suitable choice of
T0 and/or T1.
Figure 8 illustrates the transition paths for a shock featuring G = 0.1, tE = 37, ξ = 0.1,
T0 = 0.0564, and T1 = 0.0342. By making all generations pay for the abatement policy,
the tax path lies in between the two branches of the path for G (t) – see the dashed line in
panel (c). As is illustrated in panel (d), public debt accumulates at a rapid pace during the
active phase of the abatement policy (0 ≤ t < tE) but is stabilized rapidly thereafter. The
long-run debt-output ratio is equal to (Bˆ/Yˆ )1 = 2.1721 whilst the debt-service ratio settles
at (rˆBˆ/Yˆ )1 = 0.0913.
The long-run public debt burden causes a reduction in the steady-state capital stock, from
Kˆ0 = 2.7273 to Kˆ1 = 2.6566, and an increase in the steady-state interest rate, from rˆ0 = 0.04
to r1 = 0.042. Interestingly, the ecology settles at a cleaner equilibrium than in the core model
because capital is crowded out also in the long-run, i.e. Pˆ1 = 0.0906 (< PˆG = 0.0936). So even
19This form represents an analytically tractable way to model intergenerational redistribution. It is quite
standard in the literature – see, e.g., Bovenberg and Heijdra (1998, 2002).
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though future newborns are confronted with a higher tax bill and lower wages than they would
have been in the absence of debt policy, they do inherit a cleaner environment as a result
of this financing method. Using the welfare measures explained in Appendix C, we find for
shock-time newborns EV (0, 0) = 13.5% and for steady-state newborns EV (∞,∞) = 11.4%.
So the debt policy has almost eliminated the difference in welfare gains between the two types
of newborns.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have studied the environmental and economic effects of public abatement
activities in the presence of multiple stable steady-state ecological equilibria. Under shallow-
lake dynamics (SLD), the isocline for the stock of pollution feature two stable branches, a
good and a bad one. If the ecology is initially located on the lower (good) branch then the
traditional results are confirmed: the ecological equilibrium is non-hysteretic and the only
role for permanent public abatement is to select the welfare optimizing stock of pollution
(internalization of the pollution externality).
Matters are drastically different if the ecology is initially located on the upper (bad) branch
of the pollution isocline; the case studied in this paper. In such a setting, the ecological
equilibrium is hysteretic and a suitably designed temporary abatement policy can be used to
steer the environment from the bad to the good equilibrium. In all models considered in this
paper, a “cold turkey” abatement policy is optimal, i.e. the highest feasible shock should be
conducted for the shortest possible amount of time.
Interestingly, the particular model used to characterize the economic system has non-
trivial implications for the ease with which a successful abatement policy can be conducted.
This is because of the existence of capital feedback effects that augment the flow of dirt.
Compared to the core model with long-lived agents and exogenous labour supply, the model
with endogenous labour supply makes policy harder whilst the model with finite lives makes it
easier. In the overlapping generations model, bond policy can be used to smooth the benefits
from the environmental cleanup across generations.
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Appendix: Welfare analysis
In this section we study the welfare properties of the core model. We start by characterizing
the first-best optimum and demonstrating that it cannot be decentralized with the abatement
instrument. Next we turn to the second-best optimum – one which can be decentralized. For
both cases we assume that the economy finds itself initially in the polluted steady state, i.e.
point D in Figure 1.
A First-best social optimum
In the planning period t = 0, the social planner chooses paths for C (t), P (t), and K (t)
(for t ≥ 0) in order to maximize (3) subject to the resource constraint (T1.2), the emission
equation (2), and the dirt flow definition (1). The initial conditions are:
K (0) = Kˆ, P (0) = PˆB, (A.1)
where PˆB is the steady-state pollution level associated with Dˆ0 = κKˆ in Figure 1. Abatement,
the dirt flow, and gross investment must remain non-negative:
G (t) ≥ 0, [D (t) ≡]κK (t)−γG (t) ≥ 0 [I (t) ≡]F (K (t) , 1)−C (t)−G (t) ≥ 0. (A.2)
Dropping the time index, the current-value Hamiltonian can be written as:
H ≡ lnC + εE ln
[
E¯ − P
]
+ λK · [F (K, 1)− C −G− δK]
+ λP ·
[
−piP +
P 2
P 2 + 1
+ κK − γG
]
+ ηD · [κK − γG] + ηI · [F (K, 1)− C −G] .
The control variables for this optimization problem are C and G (and thus implicitly D and
I), the state variables are K and P , the co-state variables are λK and λP , and ηD and ηI are
the Lagrange multipliers for the dirt and investment constraints. The first-order conditions
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are:
∂H
∂C
=
1
C
− (λK + ηI) = 0, (A.3)
∂H
∂G
= − (λK + ηI)− γ (λP + ηD) ≤ 0, G ≥ 0, G ·
∂H
∂G
= 0, (A.4)
∂H
∂ηD
= κK − γG ≥ 0, ηD ≥ 0, ηD ·
∂H
∂ηD
= 0, (A.5)
∂H
∂ηI
= F (K, 1)− C −G ≥ 0, ηI ≥ 0, ηI ·
∂H
∂ηI
= 0, (A.6)
λ˙K − ρλK = −
∂H
∂K
= −κ (λP + ηD)− [FK (K, 1)− δ]λK − ηIFK (K, 1) , (A.7)
λ˙P − ρλP = −
∂H
∂P
=
εE
E¯ − P
+
[
pi −
2P
(1 + P 2)2
]
λP . (A.8)
The first-best social optimum is characterized by (2), (T1.2), (A.1), (A.3)–(A.8) and the
transversality conditions:
lim
t→∞
e−ρtλK (t)K (t) = lim
t→∞
e−ρtλP (t)P (t) = 0. (A.9)
We study the properties of the first-best steady-state equilibrium by considering two cases.
In each case, hats denote steady-state values and the subscript “f” denotes first-best. In the
steady state gross investment is strictly positive, i.e. Iˆf = δKˆf > 0 and it follows from (A.6)
that ηˆI = 0. Two cases are possible.
Case 1: 0 < Gˆf < (κ/γ) Kˆf so that ηˆD = 0 and γλˆP = −λˆK < 0. It follows that the
steady-state first-best equilibrium is given by:
rˆf ≡ FK(Kˆf , 1)− δ = ρ+
κ
γ
, (A.10)
ρ+ pi =
2Pˆf
(1 + Pˆ 2f )
2
+ γ ·
εECˆf
E¯ − Pˆf
, (A.11)
F (Kˆf , 1) = Cˆf + Gˆf + δKˆf , (A.12)
piPˆf + γGˆf =
Pˆ 2f
Pˆ 2f + 1
+ κKˆf . (A.13)
The key thing to note is that a (Pigouvian) capital tax is needed to decentralize the first-best
equilibrium. The social optimum calls for a smaller capital stock. Equation (A.10) says that
rˆf = ρ + κ/γ but (in the absence of a capital tax) private saving behaviour will result in
rˆ = ρ. A capital tax, θK , changes (9) to:
V (t) =
∫ ∞
t
[(1− θK) · [Y (τ)− w(τ)L(τ)]− I(τ)] · e
−
∫ τ
t
r(s)dsdτ,
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so that the first-order condition for capital (in the steady state) is given by:
FK(Kˆ, 1) =
rˆ + δ
1− θK
. (A.14)
So Kˆ = Kˆf if and only if:
θK =
κ/γ
ρ+ δ + κ/γ
. (A.15)
Lacking a capital tax instrument, the first-best equilibrium cannot be decentralized with an
abatement policy.
Case 2: λˆK > −γλˆP so that Gˆf = 0. Since Kˆf > 0 it follows that Dˆf > 0 and thus
ηˆD = 0 also. The first-best steady-state equilibrium can now be written as:
rˆf ≡ FK(Kˆf , 1)− δ = ρ− κλˆP Cˆf , (A.16)
ρ+ pi =
2Pˆf
(1 + Pˆ 2f )
2
−
1
λˆP
εE
E¯ − Pˆf
, (A.17)
F (Kˆf , 1) = Cˆf + δKˆf , (A.18)
piPˆf =
Pˆ 2f
Pˆ 2f + 1
+ κKˆf , (A.19)
Just as for Case 1, a capital tax is needed to decentralize the first-best optimum.
For the calibration used in the paper (see Table 2) we find that −λˆK−γλˆP = −0.9198, i.e.
Case 2 is the relevant one and Gˆf = 0. We obtain Kˆf = 2.3177, Cˆf = 0.7901, Yˆf = 0.9524,
Pˆf = 0.0766, and Dˆf = 0.0340. The dynamic properties of the first-best optimum are
illustrated in Figure A.1. There are two critical dates characterizing the optimal solution,
namely tI = 14.80 and tD = 26.47. For 0 ≤ t ≤ tD abatement is at its maximum feasible
level and the dirt flow is reduced to zero (Df (t) = 0) – see panels (a) and (e). It follows from
(A.5) that Gf (t) = (κ/γ)Kf (t) during that time. For 0 ≤ t ≤ tI gross investment is also
equal to zero (If (t) = 0), so that the dynamic path for capital accumulation during that time
is given by K˙f (t) = −δKf (t) (see panel (c)) and the path for consumption is described by
Cf (t) = F (Kf (t) , 1)− (κ/γ)Kf (t) (see panel (d)). For t > tI the non-negativity constraint
for gross investment ceases to be binding and for tI < t ≤ tD the consumption path follows
the Euler equation C˙f (t) /Cf (t) = F (Kf (t) , 1) − (ρ+ δ + κ/γ). For t > tD abatement is
reduced to zero (Gf (t) = 0) and the dirt flow becomes positive. The optimal path is described
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by:
C˙f (t)
Cf (t)
= FK (Kf , 1)− (ρ+ δ) + κλP (t)Cf (t) ,
λ˙P (t) =
εE
E¯ − Pf (t)
+
[
ρ+ pi −
2Pf (t)
(1 + Pf (t)
2)2
]
λP (t) ,
K˙f (t) = F (Kf (t) , 1)− Cf (t)− δKf (t) ,
P˙f (t) = −piPf (t) +
Pf (t)
2
Pf (t)
2 + 1
+ κKf (t) .
This system converges to the steady state given in (A.16)–(A.19). The welfare effect of the
first-best optimal policy is huge, the EV(0) is 172.73%.
B Second-best social optimum
We follow the approach exposited by Judd (1999). In the second-best optimum, in addition
to the resource constraint (T1.2), the emission equation (2), and the dirt flow definition (1),
the social planner faces the following private sector constraints:20
λH =
1
C
, λ˙H = [ρ+ δ − FK (K, 1)] · λH . (B.1)
Substituting the dirt constraint into the emission equation, the current-value Hamiltonian
can now be written as:
H ≡ lnC + εE ln
[
E¯ − P
]
+ λK · [F (K, 1)− C −G− δK]
+ λP ·
[
−piP +
P 2
P 2 + 1
+ κK − γG
]
+ ηλ · [ρ+ δ − FK (K, 1)] · λH
+ ηC ·
[
1
C
− λH
]
+ ηD · [κK − γG] + ηI · [F (K, 1)− C −G] .
The control variables are C and G (and thus D and I), the state variables are K, P , and λH ,
the associated co-state variables are λK , λP , and ηλ, and the Lagrange multipliers are ηC ,
20Together these give rise to the Euler equation in the decentralized equilibrium:
C˙
C
= r − ρ, r ≡ FK (K, 1)− δ.
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Figure A.1: The first-best optimal policy in the core model
(a) government abatement (G(t)) (b) capital tax (θK(t))
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ηD and ηI . The most relevant first-order conditions are the expressions in (B.1) and:
∂H
∂C
=
1
C
− λK −
ηC
C2
= 0, (B.2)
∂H
∂G
= − (λK + ηI)− γ (λP + ηD) ≤ 0, G ≥ 0, G ·
∂H
∂G
= 0, (B.3)
∂H
∂ηD
= κK − γG ≥ 0, ηD ≥ 0, ηD ·
∂H
∂ηD
= 0, (B.4)
∂H
∂ηI
= F (K, 1)− C −G ≥ 0, ηI ≥ 0, ηI ·
∂H
∂ηI
= 0, (B.5)
λ˙K − ρλK = −
∂H
∂K
= −κ (λP + ηD)− [FK (K, 1)− δ]λK − ηIFK (K, 1)
+FKK (K, 1) ηλλH , (B.6)
λ˙P − ρλP = −
∂H
∂P
=
εE
E¯ − P
+
[
pi −
2P
(1 + P 2)2
]
λP , (B.7)
η˙λ − ρηλ = −
∂H
∂λH
= [FK (K, 1)− δ − ρ] ηλ + ηC . (B.8)
We again study the properties of the steady-state second-best equilibrium by considering
two cases. The subscript “s” denotes second-best. As for the first-best social optimum,
steady-state investment is strictly positive and ηˆI = 0.
Case 1: 0 < Gˆs < (κ/γ) Kˆs so that ηˆD = 0 and γλˆP = −λˆK < 0. Upon simplification
we find:
FK(Kˆs, 1)− δ = ρ, (B.9)
ρ+ pi =
2Pˆs
(1 + Pˆ 2s )
2
+ γ ·
εECˆs
E¯ − Pˆs
·
Cˆs
Cˆs + ρηˆλ
, (B.10)
F (Kˆs, 1) = Cˆs + Gˆs + δKˆs, (B.11)
piPˆs + γGˆs =
Pˆ 2s
Pˆ 2s + 1
+ κKˆs, (B.12)
κ
γ
= −FKK(Kˆs, 1)
ηˆλCˆs
Cˆs + ρηˆλ
, (B.13)
where we have used λˆK = λˆH(1+ρηˆλλˆH), λˆH = 1/Cˆs, ηˆC = −ρηˆλ. Of course, by construction,
the second-best optimum can be decentralized with an abatement policy. The optimal capital
stock is equal to the Keynes-Ramsey level, i.e. Kˆs = Kˆ. The same holds for output, i.e.
Yˆs = Yˆ . Note that the solutions reduce to the first-best optimum values if ηˆλ and ηˆC were
zero, i.e. if the policy maker could somehow ignore the requirement that households must be
on their optimal consumption Euler equation. In the second-best optimum, however, these
constraints are binding and the first-order conditions are different for the two types of social
optimum.
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Case 2: λˆK > −γλˆP so that Gˆs = 0. Since Kˆs > 0 it follows that Dˆs > 0 and thus
ηˆD = 0 also. In the steady-state, FK(Kˆs, 1) − δ = ρ, so that Kˆs = Kˆ, Yˆs = Yˆ , and thus
Cˆs = Cˆ (since Gˆs = 0). In the second-best optimum, the ecology moves from point D to A
in Figure 1 in the paper, Pˆs = PˆG and the dirt flow equals Dˆs = Dˆ0.
For the calibration used in the paper (see Table 2) we find that Case 2 is the relevant
one and Gˆs = 0. The dynamic properties of the second-best optimum are illustrated in
Figure B.1. There is one date characterizing the optimal solution, namely tD = 27. For
0 ≤ t ≤ tD abatement is at its maximum feasible level and the dirt flow is reduced to zero
(Df (t) = 0) – see panels (a) and (d). It follows from (B.4) that Gs (t) = (κ/γ)Ks (t) during
that time. Optimal consumption is constrained to follow its decentralized Euler equation
for all t ≥ 0, i.e. C˙s (t) /Cs (t) = F (Ks (t) , 1) − (ρ+ δ) (see panel (c)). As a consequence
gross investment remains non-negative and the dynamic path for capital accumulation for
0 ≤ t ≤ tD is given by K˙s (t) = F (Ks (t) , 1) − Cs (t) − (δ + κ/γ)Ks (t) (see panel (b)). For
t > tD abatement is reduced to zero (Gs (t) = 0) and the dirt flow becomes positive. By
defining ΩH (t) ≡ λH (t) ηλ (t) we can characterize the optimal path by:
C˙s (t)
Cs (t)
= FK (Ks, 1)− (ρ+ δ) ,
λ˙P (t) =
εE
E¯ − Ps (t)
+
[
ρ+ pi −
2Ps (t)
(1 + Ps (t)
2)2
]
λP (t) ,
λ˙K (t) = [ρ+ δ − FK (Ks (t) , 1)]λK (t)− κλP (t) + FKK (Ks (t) , 1)ΩH (t) ,
Ω˙H (t) = ρΩH (t) + 1− λK (t)Cs (t) ,
K˙s (t) = F (Ks (t) , 1)− Cs (t)− δKs (t) ,
P˙s (t) = −piPs (t) +
Ps (t)
2
Ps (t)
2 + 1
+ κKs (t) .
This system converges to the steady state featuring Kˆs = Kˆ, Yˆs = Yˆ , Cˆs = Cˆ, Gˆs = 0,
Pˆs = PˆG, and Dˆs = Dˆ0. The welfare effect of the second-best optimal policy amount to an
EV(0) value of 40.49%. This must be compared to an EV(0) value of 33.7% for the ad hoc
policy studied in the text (Introducing a time-invariant capital tax θK (t) = 0.25 ∀t would
raise the EV(0) value to 43.18%.). Clearly the ad hoc policy is a good approximation to the
second-best optimal policy as is asserted in the text.
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Figure B.1: The second-best optimal policy in the core model
(a) government abatement (G(t))
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C Equivalent-variation welfare measure for the BY model
We compute the equivalent variation welfare measure for the BY model as follows. First, we
note that welfare for the initial steady-state newborn at point D is given by:
EΛD (0, 0) ≡
∫ ∞
0
[
ln Cˆ (0, t) + εE ln
[
E¯ − PˆB
] ]
· e−(ρ+µ)tdt,
Cˆ (0, t) = Cˆ (0, 0) · erˆt,
where Cˆ (0, 0) = (ρ+ µ) Hˆ (0) and Hˆ (0) = wˆ
rˆ+µ . It follows that:
EΛD (0, 0) ≡ rˆ ·
∫ ∞
0
te−(ρ+µ)tdt+
1
ρ+ µ
ln Cˆ (0, 0) + εE ln
[
E¯ − PˆB
]
ρ+ µ
. (C.1)
With the abatement policy, welfare for a shock-time newborn is given by:
EΛA (0, 0) ≡
∫ ∞
0
[
lnC (0, t) + εE ln
[
E¯ − P (t)
] ]
· e−(ρ+µ)tdt, (C.2)
where we must use the actual paths for C (0, t) and P (t) to evaluate this integral. We
compute C ′ (0, 0) such that EΛD (0, 0) evaluated for this consumption level equals EΛA (0, 0).
The welfare measure is the given by:
EV (0, 0) ≡ 100 ·
C ′ (0, 0)− Cˆ (0, 0)
Cˆ (0, 0)
. (C.3)
For the steady-state newborns we find:
EΛA (∞,∞) ≡ rˆn ·
∫ ∞
0
te−(ρ+µ)tdt+
1
ρ+ µ
ln Cˆn (0, 0) + εE ln
[
E¯ − Pˆn
]
ρ+ µ
, (C.4)
where Cˆn (∞,∞) = (ρ+ µ)
wˆn−Tˆn
rˆn+µ
and the subscript n designates the new steady state. (Of
course, without bond policy, rˆn = rˆ, wˆn = wˆ, Tˆn = 0, Cˆn (0, τ) = Cˆ (0, τ), and Pˆn = PˆG).
The welfare measure EV (∞,∞) is obtained from (C.3) by finding C ′ (0, 0) which, upon
substitution in (C.1), results in EΛD (0, 0) = EΛA (∞,∞).
References
Arrow, K. J., Bolin, B., Costanza, R., Dasgupta, P., Folke, C., Holling, C., Jansson, B.-
O., Levin, S., Ma¨ler, K.-G., Perrings, C., and Pimentel, D. (1995). Economic growth,
carrying capacity, and the environment. Science, 268:520–521.
36
Biggs, R., Carpenter, S. R., and Brock, W. A. (2009). Turning back from the brink: Detecting
an impending regime shift in time to avert it. Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences, 106:826–831.
Blanchard, O.-J. (1985). Debts, deficits, and finite horizons. Journal of Political Economy,
93:223–247.
Bovenberg, A. L. and Heijdra, B. J. (1998). Environmental tax policy and intergenerational
distribution. Journal of Public Economics, 67:1–24.
Bovenberg, A. L. and Heijdra, B. J. (2002). Environmental abatement and intergenerational
distribution. Environmental and Resource Economics, 23:45–84.
Brock, W. A. and Starrett, D. (2003). Managing systems with non-convex positive feedback.
Environmental and Resource Economics, 26:575–602.
Cre´pin, A.-S. (2003). Multiple species boreal forests: What Faustmann missed. Environmental
and Resource Economics, 26:625–646.
Cre´pin, A.-S. (2007). Using fast and slow processes to manage resources with thresholds.
Environmental and Resource Economics, 36:191–213.
Heijdra, B. J. (2009). Foundations of Modern Macroeconomics. Oxford University Press,
Oxford, second edition.
Heijnen, P. and Wagener, F. (2009). Managing the environment and the economy in the
presence of hysteresis and irreversibility. Mimeo, CeNDEF, University of Amsterdam,
(March).
Janssen, M. A., Anderies, J. M., and Walker, B. H. (2004). Robust strategies for managing
rangelands with multiple stable attractors. Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management, 47:140–162.
Judd, K. L. (1999). Optimal taxation and spending in general competitive growth models.
Journal of Public Economics, 71:1–26.
37
Levin, S. A. and Pacala, S. W. (2003). Ecosystem dynamics. In Ma¨ler, K.-G. and Vin-
cent, J. R., editors, Handbook of Environmental Economics, volume 1. North-Holland,
Amsterdam.
Ma¨ler, K.-G. and Li, C.-Z. (2010). Measuring sustainability under regime shift uncertainty:
A resilience pricing approach. Environmental and Development Economics, 15:707–719.
Ma¨ler, K.-G., Xepapadeas, A., and de Zeeuw, A. (2003). The economics of shallow lakes.
Environmental and Resource Economics, 26:603–624.
Muradian, R. (2001). Ecological thresholds: A survey. Ecological Economics, 38:7–24.
Prieur, F. (2009). The environmental Kuznets curve in a world of irreversibility. Economic
Theory, 40:57–90.
Ranjan, R. and Shortle, J. (2007). The environmental Kutnets curve when the environment
exhibits hysteresis. Ecological Economics, 64:204–215.
Scheffer, M., Carpenter, S., Foley, J. A., Folke, C., and Walker, B. (2001). Catastrophic shifts
in ecosystems. Nature, 413:591–596.
Wagener, F. (2009). Shallow lake economics run deep. Discussion Paper TI 2009-033/1,
Tinbergen Institute.
Wirl, F. (2004). Sustainable growth, renewable resources and pollution: Thresholds and
cycles. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 28:1149–1157.
Xepapadeas, A. (2005). Economic growth and the environment. In Ma¨ler, K.-G. and Vin-
cent, J. R., editors, Handbook of Environmental Economics, volume 3. North-Holland,
Amsterdam.
Yaari, M. E. (1965). Uncertain lifetime, life insurance, and the theory of the consumer. Review
of Economic Studies, 32:137–150.
38
  
Authors: Ben J. Heijdra, Pim Heijnen 
 
Title:  Environmental Policy and the Macroeconomy in the Presence of Ecological Thresholds 
 
Reihe Ökonomie / Economics Series 269 
 
Editor: Robert M. Kunst (Econometrics) 
Associate Editors: Walter Fisher (Macroeconomics), Klaus Ritzberger (Microeconomics)  
 
ISSN: 1605-7996 
© 2011 by the Department of Economics and Finance, Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS), 
Stumpergasse 56, A-1060 Vienna   +43 1 59991-0  Fax +43 1 59991-555  http://www.ihs.ac.at  
 
 ISSN: 1605-7996 
 
